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Abstract
Newman estimated that 42 per cent of the decline in mortality in Sri Lanka between 1930-1945
and 1946-1960 was attributable to DDT-spraying; Molineaux estimated 27 per cent; Gray judged
that 23 per cent of the decline between 1936-1945 and 1946-1960 was due to DDT. Here the
Newman-Gray-Molineaux approach is criticized, the main point being that they ignored a
significant improvement in mortality in the early 1940s, before DDT-spraying. Bearing this, and
certain other complexities of the situation, in mind, an attempt is made to assess the impact of
DDT on mortality.
Immediately after the Second World War Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) embarked on a program of
DDT-spraying designed at least to suppress, and if possible even to eliminate, malaria, by
killing the adult mosquitoes responsible for spreading the disease. Until then malaria had
figured very prominently in Sri Lankan morbidity and mortality. Death rates then improved
considerably in the late 1940s, prompting the suggestion by some that DDT-spraying had
been largely responsible. However, others disagreed and a debate ensued about the relative
importance of the DDT campaign, on the one hand, and improved provision of health
services or a variety of social and economic factors, on the other. The population of Sri
Lanka, according to the 1946 census, was 6.7 million.
DDT-spraying had begun in earnest in November 1945, after a few small-scale
experiments earlier that year utilizing supplies provided by the military authorities, and
covered all malarial areas by 1947 (Rajendram and Jayewickreme 1951:22; Visvalingam
1961:64). According to Cullumbine the effect was dramatic: noting a marked drop in the
crude death rate in Sri Lanka from 20.3 deaths per 1000 population in 1946 to 14.3 in 1947,
and 13.2 in 1948, he observed: ‘This sudden drop in the rate can be attributed almost entirely
to the near-eradication of malaria following the successful use of D.D.T. as a control measure
for mosquitoes’ (Cullumbine 1950:120). Sarkar, however, disagreed, arguing that mortality
was already following a long-run downward trend in Sri Lanka from well before the Second
World War, and that the postwar decline might well be largely a continuation of this (Sarkar
1957:121-125). Sarkar was
...inclined to believe that the low death rate of today has been the result of a number of
factors of which D.D.T. spraying is one, which have been operating with a cumulative
effect ... The operation of this process has probably been accelerated recently by the
improvement in curative and preventive medicine, in the political status of the country and
in the economic situation generally (Sarkar 1957:124-125).
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Coale and Hoover (1958:62-67) concluded that DDT-spraying was responsible for
‘something less than half’ (p.66, footnote 13) of the decline in mortality in Sri Lanka between
the period 1936-1945 and the period 1950-1952. Newman estimated that 42 per cent of the
fall in the average annual crude death rate in Sri Lanka between the periods 1930-1945 and
1946-1960 was attributable to DDT-spraying, though possibly aided by quinine use
(Newman 1965:3,48-49; 1970:157, note 17; Newman and Meegama 1969:285).
Meegama (1967) believed that Newman's analysis overstated the significance of the
DDT campaign. He argued that Newman had overlooked a very important point: that in the
immediate postwar period the malarial areas of Sri Lanka had profited not only from DDT-
spraying but also from a disproportionate improvement in health services, as well as possibly
in nutrition. Meegama also expressed the view, though this point was put less strongly and
not pressed by him in the subsequent debate, that mortality in Sri Lanka was already clearly
falling in the late 1930s and the early part of the war, so that the postwar decline in mortality
should in part be seen as the resumption of an earlier trend which had then been interrupted
by various difficulties in the latter part of the war.
Meade (1968) did not accept this second point of Meegama's and found it difficult to
make a judgement in the case of the first. He concluded that although health measures of one
kind or another were responsible for the fall in mortality in Sri Lanka (and some other
countries) after the war ‘the relative importance of malaria eradication by residual spraying as
against other general and less specific health measures is to some extent an open question’
(p.109). Very similar views to Meade's were expressed in a leading article in The Lancet at
the time (1968, 1:899-900).
Frederiksen (1970) believed, like Meegama, that Newman had overestimated the impact
of DDT in Sri Lanka. He saw the postwar improvement in mortality as largely the resumption
of a long-run downward trend after an interruption in the latter part of the war; and felt that
fluctuations in standard of living and especially in food availability might well be an
important element in the situation (Frederiksen 1960, 1961, 1962, 1966). He thought that no
more than 19 per cent of the decline in the crude death rate in Sri Lanka between 1944, the
last year before spraying began, and 1954, which he considered the appropriate comparison
to make, could have been due to DDT-spraying (Frederiksen 1970).
Gray (1974) estimated that 23 per cent1 of the postwar decline in the crude death rate in
Sri Lanka was attributable to DDT-spraying. His approach followed that of Newman (1965)
but with two modifications. Newman's estimation depended on a linear regression equation
linking the absolute fall in the average annual crude death rate between the periods 1930-
1945 and 1946-1960 in the 21 districts of Sri Lanka, as dependent variable, to the average so-
called ‘spleen rate’ in the districts for the period 1938-1941. The ‘spleen rate’, the proportion
of school children found in surveys to have an enlarged spleen, was taken as an indication of
the level of malaria in a district, an enlarged spleen being one of the possible symptoms of
malaria; the years 1938-1941 were the last for which this information was available before to
the DDT campaign. Since spleen rates effectively became zero throughout Sri Lanka not
many years after the Second World War (Newman 1965:91-92) the rates for 1938-1941 also
represent the improvement in spleen rates that took place over this period. Gray modified
Newman's approach, first, by using as dependent variable in the linear regression the
proportional rather than absolute decline in the crude death rate, which he argued was more
appropriate, and secondly, by considering changes not between 1930-1945 and 1946-1960
but between 1936-1945 and 1946-1960: this latter change was because there was a very
serious malaria epidemic in Sri Lanka in 1934-1935 which Gray believed might distort the
analysis.
                                                
1According to Newman (1977:260), given Gray's approach, this figure should have been 22 per cent.
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Newman subsequently seemed implicitly to accept this second point of Gray's in that he
too compared the periods 1936-1945 and 1946-1960 when he re-examined this question
using a Box-Cox approach; however his ‘best’ estimate of the contribution of the DDT-
campaign to the fall in the crude death rate in Sri Lanka between these two periods, using this
approach, was still 44 per cent; with his original regression approach but the periods
suggested by Gray, Newman's estimate would have been 48 per cent (Newman 1977).
Molineaux, on the other hand, felt that Gray's regression approach, relating the proportional
decline in the district crude death rates to the 1938-1941 spleen rates, was the more realistic,
though he preferred the periods of time employed originally by Newman; on this basis he
calculated that 27 per cent of the reduction in the crude death rate in Sri Lanka between 1930-
1945 and 1946-60 was attributable to DDT-spraying (Molineaux 1985).
Both Gray (1974) and Newman (1977) specifically rejected Meegama's assertion that in
the immediate postwar period malarial areas in Sri Lanka enjoyed a disproportionate
improvement in health services and possibly in nutrition. Neither of them seriously dealt with
Meegama's other point, that there was a noticeable drop in mortality just before and in the
early part of the Second World War, and that this must be taken into account in considering
the possible reasons for the postwar mortality decline. Gray's analysis simply did not point to
such a dip in mortality (Gray 1974). Newman, responding to observations made by
Frederiksen about a mortality decline in that period, spoke of the ‘well-known dangers in
basing trends in a fluctuating series on such a short time series’ (Newman 1970:153).
In what follows, the whole question of the possible reasons for the decline in mortality in
Sri Lanka after the Second World War is re-examined. Possibly the most important point to
emerge is that Meegama was right that there was a noticeable fall in mortality in the late
1930s and early 1940s which must be taken into account in judging subsequent
developments. This is demonstrated by a more detailed analysis of year-by-year changes in
mortality in Sri Lanka than has hitherto been attempted, involving the consideration of infant
and maternal as well as overall mortality, and the examination of changes in different parts of
the country, supported by some completely new analysis of a whole range of data relating to
public health activities in Sri Lanka. A number of other significant points, overlooked in
previous work, are also brought out. It should be emphasized that this matter does not just
have historical significance, though that would make it important enough. Views about what
happened in Sri Lanka may well inform and therefore influence present-day approaches to
malaria control (see, for example, the recent review by Bradley 1993).
Malaria and malaria control in Sri Lanka before DDT-spraying
Sri Lanka is an island not far north of the equator (5o55’ - 9o50’N), just off the south-east tip
of India. It is about 140 miles across at its widest point and 270 miles from north to south.
The south-central part of the island is mountainous, ranging from about 1000 feet to more
than 7000 feet above sea level; this is the so-called hill country where most of Sri Lanka's tea
is grown. The south-western coastal districts of the island together with this adjoining hill
country are well watered and make up the ‘wet zone’ of Sri Lanka; the remainder of the
island, which has much less rainfall, constitutes the ‘dry zone’ (see map presented as Figure
1). Some accounts refer also to an ‘intermediate zone’ on the fringes of the other two zones.
Whereas the wet zone of Sri Lanka tends to experience rainfall both during the south-west
monsoon, which typically blows from May to September, and the north-east monsoon, which
typically blows from November to March, the dry zone usually experiences rainfall only in
connection with the north-east monsoon; moreover, the south-west monsoon is generally
more reliable and associated with heavier rainfall than the north-east monsoon. Both zones
tend to experience thunderstorms in the inter-monsoon periods.
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Figure 1
Districts of Sri Lanka subdivided into wet zone and dry zone districts
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Malaria is spread by female anopheline mosquitoes: a person becomes infected when
bitten by a mosquito which has itself taken in malaria parasites some time before by biting an
infected person. The particularities of malaria transmission in Sri Lanka were established by
Carter in the 1920s and early 1930s. He was a medical entomologist appointed by the
Government of Ceylon in 1921 to study the problem. Carter discovered that although there
were 15 or more species of anopheline mosquitoes in Sri Lanka, several of which were,
moreover, known to be implicated in malaria transmission elsewhere, only one species was
involved in malaria transmission in Sri Lanka: Anopheles culicifacies2 (Carter 1927; Gill
1935; Visvalingam 1961). This was essentially a dry zone species, though in particular
circumstances it proliferated in parts of the wet zone.
The dry zone of Sri Lanka had (indeed has) a very large number of water storage ‘tanks’
with associated irrigation systems. This, and some other features of the dry zone, meant that
the kinds of pools, and puddles, and slow-moving streams in which A. culicifacies could
breed were fairly common. Hence malaria was endemic in the dry zone, though with seasonal
upsurges in the aftermath of rain. In the wet zone, on the other hand, in the ordinary course of
events there were few opportunities for A. culicifacies to breed, though it was always present,
hence little malaria. However, if there was a prolonged drought in the wet zone, pools would
form in river beds, because of the fall in water levels, which provided ideal breeding sites for
A. culicifacies, and a malaria epidemic would ensue; the impact of such an epidemic would
be the greater because of the relative lack of previous exposure and therefore immunity of the
population to the disease. There tended to be such epidemics of malaria in the wet, and
especially the ‘intermediate’, zone of Sri Lanka about every five years; the worst of these
came as a result of the complete failure of the usually relatively reliable south-west monsoon.
Since the breeding capability of A. culicifacies is markedly reduced at altitudes over 2500
feet, the more elevated parts of the hill country were, however, completely free of the disease,
or at least of locally-generated cases of it (see Carter 1927; Briercliffe 1935; Gill 1935;
Rajendram and Jayewickreme 1951; Visvalingam 1961).
According to Rajendram and Jayewickreme (1951:2) there were malaria epidemics in Sri
Lanka in 1906, 1911, 1914, 1919, 1923, 1928-1929, 1934-1935, 1939-1940, 1943 and 1945-
1946.
The fact that malaria is transmitted by mosquitoes had been known since the very end of
the nineteenth century following work by Ross. In Sri Lanka, from the beginning of the
twentieth century, attempts were made to control malaria by eliminating mosquitoes'
breeding places: through drainage of wet areas, through in-filling of depressions, through
repair and proper maintenance of water channels, through thorough and regular removal of
refuse, which might otherwise provide receptacles for water, etc. Later, in addition, mosquito
breeding sites were sprayed with oil, or various other compounds, in order to kill mosquito
larvae; larvivorous fish were introduced. There was also some use of insecticides. Beginning
in a small way but increasingly as time went on, quinine was distributed, both for malaria
treatment and for use prophylactically (see Rajendram and Jayewickreme 1951; Visvalingam
1961; see also the annual Reports of the Principal Civil Medical Officer of Ceylon  and the
later Reports of the Director of Medical and Sanitary Services of Ceylon).
The extent of such anti-malarial activity in Sri Lanka was relatively limited initially but
increased during the 1920s and into the 1930s. The particularly severe malaria epidemic of
1934-1935 undoubtedly came as a shock and even an affront to Sri Lanka's Department of
Medical and Sanitary Services. Following reports on this outbreak by Briercliffe (1935) and
Gill (1935) the Malaria Control and Health Scheme was brought into operation in late 1936.
This expressly provided for not only a whole battery of direct anti-malarial activities,
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including precautionary larvicidal spraying in areas judged to be showing pre-epidemic signs,
but also a range of more general health measures: it embodied the notion that malaria could
not be seen in isolation from more general health problems and that tackling these problems
would also reduce the impact of malaria; the scheme was seen as having particular relevance
for rural areas. In the words of the Director of Medical and Sanitary Services for Ceylon in
his report for 1937,
Malaria in rural areas cannot be dealt with in the same way as in urban areas. In the latter
... it is possible for intensive anti-larval work to be undertaken on a reasonably economical
basis; but this is not possible in wide areas with scattered population and where rice
cultivation depends generally on artificial irrigation. The work that is being carried out
consists of direct and indirect methods for the amelioration of existing conditions in regard
to malaria. The direct method is chiefly the treating of the disease and the control of the
insect vector as far as possible and the indirect method deals with conditions the existence
of which aggravate the incidence of malaria[,] by caring for the mother and child through
maternity and child welfare work, by caring for the school child through school health
work, by giving mass hookworm treatment, by treatment for parangi [yaws], by control of
communicable diseases, general sanitary work, and by health education (Ceylon 1938:
Part 4, C38).
The Malaria Control and Health Scheme continued in operation through the late 1930s
and throughout the Second World War, though with varying activity, and was still in place at
the time of the postwar DDT-spraying campaign. Beginning in 1943, and especially from
1944 onwards, in addition to larvicidal spraying of mosquito breeding sites, there was fairly
extensive spraying of pyrethrum insecticide inside houses to kill adult mosquitoes.3 This
activity was superseded as the DDT-spraying campaign got under way. DDT was also used
as an insecticide, in the domestic setting. However it was longer-lasting in its effect, being
sprayed on walls and other surfaces and continuing to kill mosquitoes which landed there for
some time, i.e. it was a ‘residual’ insecticide, so that much less frequent spraying was
required than with pyrethrum (see Rajendram and Jayewickreme 1951; Visvalingam 1961;
also the annual reports of the Principal Civil Medical Officer and the Director of Medical and
Sanitary Services).
Trends and fluctuations in mortality in Sri Lanka, 1900-1954
All of the measures presented here have been calculated from Sri Lankan census and
registration data. Census data were taken from the census reports: there were censuses of Sri
Lanka in 1901, 1911, 1921, 1931, 1946 and 1953. Registration data were obtained from the
annual Reports of the Registrar General of Ceylon on Vital Statistics.
Material is presented for the whole of Sri Lanka and for five areal subdivisions of the
country, each subdivision comprising one or more of the (then) 21 administrative districts of
the island. Sri Lanka was split first into ‘wet’ and ‘dry’ zones; the wet zone was then further
subdivided into three areas and the dry zone into two areas (see Table 1 and map presented as
Figure 1). The grouping of districts into wet and dry zones has been taken from United
Nations (1976:35).
                                                
3In fact, there had been some, intermittent and small-scale, spraying of insecticide inside houses in Sri
Lanka since 1934.
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Table 1
Minimum, maximum and mean annual infant mortality rates over the period 1900-1944, and
average spleen rates 1938-1941, for the districts of the wet zone and of the dry zone of Sri Lanka
Zone, sub-zone and
district Infant mortality rate
a Average spleen
rateb 1938-1941%
Min Max Mean
Wet zone
I Kalutara 81 144 117 1.4
Galle 100 159 133 2.9
II Colombo 103 186 150 2.4
Negombo 103 271 141 9.4
Matara 96 178 135 16.0
III Kandy 119 306 186 10.2
Nuwara Eliya 121 254 193 10.7
Ratnapura 113 254 175 12.2
Kegalle 93 482 158 13.6
Dry Zone
I Jaffna 120 240 185 6.7
II Matale 133 433 218 39.2
Hambantota 152 393 235 62.6
Mannar 215 574 346 35.4
Mullaittivuc 200 581 298 65.3
Batticaloa 164 306 224 37.8
Trincomalee 164 462 245 39.5
Kurunegala 131 716 243 39.6
Puttalam 226 485 313 50.4
Chilaw 99 329 153 17.3
Anuradhapura 194 487 292 67.3
Badulla 114 263 192 25.1
aRegistered infant deaths in year divided by registered live births, expressed per 1000 live births.
bThe spleen rate is the percentage of school children found in surveys to have an enlarged spleen. These
figures come from Newman (1965:92).
cMullaittivu district was subsequently renamed Vavuniya district and has now been split into
Mallaittivu and Vavuniya districts.
This fivefold areal subdivision of Sri Lanka was adopted largely on the basis of what
previous researchers had concluded about the differing importance of malaria historically in
different parts of the country. The dry zone was distinguished from the wet zone since, as
already noted, malaria had been found to be endemic in most of the dry zone but hardly at all
in the wet zone. The district of Jaffna was, however, separated out from the rest of the dry
zone, since previous work suggested that malaria levels there were more akin to those found
in the wet zone than the dry zone. Kalutara and Galle districts were separated out together
from the wet zone since historically these areas had been found to suffer little from malaria.
The remainder of the wet zone, parts of which were subject to malaria epidemics, was
divided into two, mainly on the basis of the mortality differences indicated by the data of
Table 1 but also bearing in mind that one of the resulting areas, labelled as sub-zone III of the
wet zone in Table 1, included many tea estates and so might have different experience from
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other areas (see Carter 1927; Briercliffe 1935; Gill 1935, 1940; Abhayaratne 1950;
Rajendram and Jayewickreme 1951; Visvalingam 1961; Newman 1965; Gray 1974).
The data shown in Table 1 by and large confirm the appropriateness of this subdivision
of Sri Lanka. In general, dry zone districts had higher infant mortality than wet zone districts
and higher spleen rates, suggesting more malaria. Jaffna, on the other hand, was more similar
to some wet zone districts in these respects than to other dry zone districts. Kalutara and
Galle were the most favoured districts in the island; even Colombo district, which like them
had an extremely low 1938-1941 spleen rate, nevertheless had somewhat higher average
infant mortality and higher peak mortality, the latter feature probably indicating a greater
susceptibility to epidemic malaria. On the figures of Table 1, both Chilaw district and
Badulla district might possibly have been dealt with separately from other dry zone districts.
This would have complicated the analysis quite considerably, however, without any very
great benefit; so this approach was not adopted.
The graphs presented in Figure 2 show changes in the crude death rate, infant mortality
rate and maternal death rate for Sri Lanka over the period 1900-1954. The data on which
these graphs are based are presented in an appendix; this is so for all graphs shown. Crude
death rates were calculated by dividing the registered deaths in a year by the total population
and expressing the result per 1000 total population; populations in non-census years were
estimated by assuming a constant rate of growth between censuses. This method of
estimating denominators was obviously not exact; however, the fact that, as may be seen
from Figure 2, the resulting crude death rates correspond almost exactly with those produced
for 1930 and later years by Newman (1965:89) using denominators estimated in a much more
elaborate fashion, suggests that these data are, nevertheless, reasonable. Infant mortality rates
were calculated by dividing the infant deaths registered in a year by the registered live births,
and maternal death rates by dividing the maternal deaths, that is, deaths associated with
pregnancy or childbirth, registered in a year by the registered live births, in each case
expressing the result per 1000 live births.
It may be seen from Figure 2 that mortality in Sri Lanka fluctuated a great deal. Most of
the upsurges in mortality were associated with outbreaks of malaria, though in 1918-1919
there was a very serious influenza epidemic, which was itself then further added to by a
malaria outbreak (Langford and Storey 1993a). From 1900 until about 1920—attempting to
set aside short-run fluctuations—the data seem to suggest a slight upward trend in mortality:
this may be genuine but is more likely to be a reflection of improvements in data quality.
From about 1920 onwards—again, disregarding short-run fluctuations—there was a general
downward trend in mortality, though in the case of maternal mortality this might not have
begun until the late 1930s. Marked fluctuations continued, however, the most notable being
the terrible rise in mortality associated with the malaria epidemic of 1934-1935, until the
immediate post-World War II period, when they apparently disappeared.
All of the data presented in Figure 2 indicate that there was a remarkable improvement in
mortality in Sri Lanka after the Second World War. Mortality dropped in 1947 to lower
levels than seen previously (since 1900) and there was further improvement subsequently. In
some degree, however, the fall in 1947 is made to seem more precipitate than it truly was by
the fact that mortality rose in Sri Lanka in the later years of the war and just afterwards.
Moreover, before this rise, mortality in Sri Lanka had actually already been falling quite
sharply, albeit only for a short period, to what were then unprecedentedly low levels, the
crude death rate and infant mortality rate dropping to a low-point in 1942 and the maternal
death rate in 1943. There had been a previous dip in the crude death rate, though apparently
not noticeably in infant and maternal mortality, in the early 1930s.
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Figure 2
Crude death rate, infant mortality rate and maternal death rate for Sri Lanka, 1900-1954
Figure 3 shows changes in the crude death rate over the period 1900-1954 for each of the
five areal subdivisions of Sri Lanka; Figure 4 shows changes in the infant mortality rate. It
may be seen that all these areas shared in the general downward trend in mortality after about
1920 in Sri Lanka. Areas differed, however, until the late 1940s, anyway, in terms of both the
typical level of mortality and the extent of mortality fluctuations. In the wet zone, sub-zone II
(see Table 1 for the districts this included) after about 1920 tended to have similar or slightly
higher mortality than sub-zone I in ‘good’ years but a larger gap opened between the two
areas when malaria struck, reflecting the greater susceptibility of sub-zone II to epidemic
malaria; in sub-zone III of the wet zone mortality tended to be somewhat higher still and the
fluctuations due to epidemic malaria even more marked. In the dry zone, Jaffna district had
higher mortality, in general, than sub-zones I to III of the wet zone but fluctuations in
mortality were not especially marked; this area seems to have been completely unscathed in
the 1934-1935 malaria outbreak. The remainder of the dry zone had higher mortality
generally than other areas of the island as well as marked fluctuations in mortality. In all parts
of Sri Lanka, however, from 1947 onwards, fluctuations in mortality were small and
differences between areas relatively slight.
Of special interest in the present connection is whether the fall in mortality in 1947 in Sri
Lanka as a whole occurred also in much the same way in these different areas of the country.
Considering the period from 1920 on, it may be seen from Figure 3 that, so far as the crude
death rate is concerned, there is no real sign of a noticeable discontinuity of trend in 1947 in
sub-zone I of the wet zone; moreover, if temporary upsurges in mortality are ignored, the
same can be said in relation to sub-zones II and III of the wet zone. In the case of Jaffna
12 C.M. Langford
Health Transition Review
Figure 3
Crude death rate per 1000 population for the sub-zones of the wet zone and the dry zone of Sri
Lanka, 1900-1954
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Figure 4
Infant mortality rate per 1000 live births for the sub-zones of the wet zone and the dry zone of Sri
Lanka, 1900-1954
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district there was apparently some acceleration in the decline of the crude death rate in the
post-World War II period, though if the improvement in the rate over the period 1934-1940 is
used as a basis for judging likely future developments rather than the whole period from 1920
on, the postwar dip below trend seems rather slight. In the remainder of the dry zone there
was, on the face of it, a clear downward shift in the crude death rate in 1947; however, even
in this case, there is the question of whether the very short-lived, but quite marked,
improvement in the rate in the early 1940s, to what was then the lowest level ever (since
1900), should be regarded as signalling the impending postwar improvement. There were, it
may be noted, new low-points in the crude death rate in all the sub-zones of Sri Lanka except
sub-zone I of the wet zone in the early 1940s.
The data on infant mortality presented in Figure 4 point even more strongly to the
question of whether the downward trend in mortality in Sri Lanka might not have taken on a
new impetus in the late 1930s or early 1940s, thus in some sense anticipating the postwar
decline. There was apparently quite a noticeable fall in the infant mortality rate in the early
1940s, albeit very short-lived and rapidly reversed, in all parts of Sri Lanka except sub-zone I
of the wet zone; even in that area there seems to have been some acceleration of the pre-
existing downward trend in the late 1930s and early 1940s.
Changes in the intensity of public health activities in Sri Lanka, 1930-1954
A variety of data relating to public health activities in Sri Lanka over the period 1930 to 1954
is presented in Tables 2 and 3. These data have been compiled from material provided in the
annual Reports of the Director of Medical and Sanitary Services of Ceylon , and the
Education reports, together with some information from the census and from vital
registration. Even at the very beginning of this period there was clearly a great deal going on:
most infants seem to have undergone at least primary vaccination against smallpox4; a very
large number of individuals were treated for hookworm infestation each year, that is, wormed
(for an account of the debilitating effects of this disease in Sri Lanka see Langford and Storey
1993b); and the School Medical Service carried out a large number of medical examinations
each year among children in schools. In the early 1930s government expenditure on health
was cut, as part of a general response to the economic difficulties of that period, and there
seems to have been a reduction in the number of primary smallpox vaccinations and in the
number of medical examinations in schools; the anti-hookworm campaign, on the other hand,
apparently increased its coverage during this time. In 1935 there was a considerable increase
in government spending on health (strictly, this was in the 12-month period beginning on 1
October 1934). However, this was obviously largely, and possibly entirely, simply a response
to the appalling malaria outbreak at that time. The number of malaria cases treated as
inpatients in hospitals or, overwhelmingly, as outpatients in hospitals or dispensaries in 1935
(5,454,781) amounted to 97 per cent of the population of Sri Lanka at that time.5 By contrast,
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 Only data on primary vaccinations against smallpox have been shown in Table 2 even though numbers
of secondary vaccinations are also provided in the official reports.  It was felt that numbers of primary
vaccinations give a better indication of the general level of vaccination activity, whereas numbers of
secondary vaccinations tend to fluctuate more in response to actual or feared smallpox outbreaks.
5See Administration Report of the Acting Director of Medical and Sanitary Services for 1935, page
C28. The number of cases reported is extremely high (though clearly labelled as such) and it is
conceivable that the same individual could have been treated more than once in the same year, or even
(as suggested by an anonymous reviewer) that the number of visits rather than cases has been reported.
Even so, the number of malaria cases treated in 1935, and the expense of providing this treatment, must
have been very high indeed.
Table 2
Some indicators of public health activities in Sri Lanka, 1930-1954
Primary smallpox
vaccinationsc
Total hookworm
treatmentsd
Typhoid inoculationse
(1000s)
Year Govt. spending  on
healtha (millions)
C h
a n
g e
f r
o m
y e
a r
b e
f o
r e
( %
)
Govt. spending  on
school mealsb (1000s)
Number
(1000s)
As % of last
year’s births
Number
(1000s)
As % of
population 1st 2nd
1930 10.7 170 86 1,294 25 5 2
1931 9.7 -9 149 73 1,406 27 4 2
1932 9.8 1 104 52 1,827 34 7 3
1933 9.3 -5 94 47 1,824 33 9 4
1934 9.4 2 143 6 1,992 36 13 7
1935 11.7 24 97 47 1,402 25 10 6
1936 11.0 -7 145 75 1,856 32 8 6
1937 11.1 1 242 163 85 2,163 37 25 18
1938 12.1 9 623 190 88 2,170 37 41 32
1939 12.9 7 972 150 72 2,112 35 - -
1940 12.9 0 1,257 178 84 2,147 35 69 55
1941 13.4 4 1,284 177 83 1,899 31 72 56
1942 14.3 7 1,506 176 80 890 14 101 77
1943 15.7 9 1,674 196 89 813 13 122 94
1944 18.2 16 3,764 168 68 1,420 22 128 96
1945 21.6 19 5,229 153 66 1,332 20 54 39
1946 28.7 33 5,863 193 81 1,376 21 55 41
1947 37.2 30 7,049 192 75 1,806 26 87 59
1948 51.7 39 7,338 217 80 1,898 27 160 116
1949 57.0 10 8.785 225 78 1,902 26 82 61
1950 62.4 9 9,591 214 73 1,861 25 88 80
1951 67.6 8 9,492 233 77 1,880 25 77 56
1952 82.5 22 10,136 228 73 1,810 23 68 55
1953 87.0 6 10,126 237 76 1,728 21 90 66
1954 90.1 4 8 223 69 1,850 83 59
aMillions of rupees. Expenditure is in fact for year ending 30 September of year shown. Figures exclude cost of new buildings as well as improvement and maintenance of old buildings.
bThousands of rupees. This expenditure is from education budget, not health budget. Probably for years ending 30 September rather than calendar years.
cFigures for 1932 and 1933 officially reported to be too low since primary vaccinations carried out as part of vaccination campaign then in response to smallpox outbreak omitted. 1941 figures may be
similarly affected.
dThese are largely what were terms ‘first’ but include subsequent treatments; hence treatments may exceed individuals treated in year.
eThe figures for 1938 relate to inoculations carried out in schools only; no all-Sri Lanka figures were provided for that year. In the case of 1937 (first and second doses) and 1936 (second doses),
disquietingly, though the figures are supposed to be for all-Sri Lanka, slightly higher numbers of inoculations were actually reported as occurring in schools alone.
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the smallpox vaccination program, the anti-hookworm campaign and the activities of the
School Medical Service all seem to have been curtailed in 1935. This was unquestionably due
in part to the direct impact of the malaria epidemic itself, since many health workers were
diverted from their usual tasks to help cope with the epidemic, and many others would no
doubt have themselves suffered from malaria at that time, but it may well also have reflected
continuing financial stringency.
Table 3
Number of government health centres providing maternity and child welfare services in Sri
Lanka, clinics held there, and attendance at clinics by mothers and children, and number of
medical examinations in schools carried out by School Medical Service, 1930-1954
Visits to clinicsa by
Year
Number of
health centres
Clinics
held
Expectant
mothers
(1000s)
Infants
(1000s)
Pre-school
children
(1000s)
School children
medically
examined (1000s)
1930 40 1,547 1 14 7 81
1931 59 2,089 3 18 17 74
1932 54 2,493 3 21 12 64
1933 73 3,199 5 30 16 61
1934 78 3,952 8 28 18 45
1935 86 4,702 10 28 17 36
1936 77 4,543 17 30 19 53
1937 207 8,395 40 88 40 85
1938 311 9,485 76 158 75 95
1939 408 16,354 101 224 98 69
1940 - - 119 246 96 77
1941 - - 155 259 88 72
1942 437 18,695 - - - 64
1943 444 15,655 - - - 78
1944 461 18,122 - - - 61
1945 503 17,227 - - - 55
1946 533 19,144 - - - 62
1947 572 16,591 324 173 67 90
1948 602 20,488 277 237 73 107
1949 662 23,971 296 330 97 102
1950 701 24,890 313 382 109 84
1951 714 25,509 413 361 168 87
1952 771 27,143 412 385 122 98
1953 755 26,151 333 370 105 128
1954 744 24,556 307 330 107 129
aThe figure for visits to clinics by pre-school children in 1935 is that reported for the whole island;
however, disquietingly, about 3,000 more such visits, almost 20,000, were separately reported for
‘health unit areas’ alone. The 1947 figures are those that appear in the 1947 Report of the Director of
Medical and Sanitary Service of Ceylon; the 1948 report, without explanation, presents different figures
for 1947: 289 instead of 324; 199 instead of 173; and 76 instead of 67.
In the years following the 1934-1935 malaria outbreak there was a general upsurge in
public health activities in Sri Lanka (see Tables 2 and 3). Government spending on health in
1936, though somewhat lower than in the epidemic year 1935, was considerably higher than
in the pre-epidemic period; moreover, this level of expenditure was maintained in 1937 and
there were further increases in 1938 and 1939. The coverage of the smallpox vaccination
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program improved during this period as did that of the anti-hookworm campaign. From 1937
onwards there was a noticeable increase in the numbers of anti-typhoid inoculations
administered. So far as maternity and child welfare services were concerned, while there had
been a steady increase in both provision and use of services between 1930 and 1936, in 1937
there was a considerable increase in activity, no doubt associated with the Malaria Control
and Health Scheme, already referred to, which came into operation in late 1936. In 1937
there was a dramatic increase in the number of health centres at which maternity and child
welfare services were provided, from 77 such centres in 1936 to 207 in 1937, and a
considerable increase also in the number of clinics held at these centres; moreover, the
numbers of visits to these clinics by expectant mothers more than doubled between 1936 and
1937, as did the number of visits by infants and by pre-school children. The extent of use of
these facilities continued to grow quite strongly until at least 1941, after which there is
unfortunately a gap in the data of some years. Beginning in 1937 (in fact, late 1936) the
government made funds available to enable midday meals to be provided for children in
schools.6 According to the Director of Education for Ceylon in his report for 1937 this was to
include (from February 1937) ‘all the children in schools in distressed areas’ (Ceylon 1938:
Part 4, A10). This expenditure on midday meals for school children grew rapidly in the late
1930s and early 1940s.
During the early years of the Second World War public health activities in Sri Lanka
were in most respects maintained or even extended; even later on, many activities continued
at reasonable levels (see Tables 2 and 3). However, the coverage of the anti-hookworm
campaign was drastically curtailed in 1942 and 1943 because of the lack of necessary
supplies. The anti-malaria program was probably also constrained by shortage of supplies, at
least before 1944. To some extent, moreover, the health of the population would undoubtedly
have been undermined by the food shortages that developed following the Japanese invasion,
in December 1941, of Burma, which had previously been an important source of rice imports
for Sri Lanka. Unfortunately, there is no information on the very important matter of the
extent of use of maternity and child welfare services during the period from 1942 to 1946.
At the end of and immediately after the Second World War, as regards most of the
specific public health measures for which information is provided in Tables 2 and 3, there
was apparently little or no sign of increased activity. The coverage of the smallpox
vaccination program and of the anti-hookworm campaign, as well as the extent of inoculation
against typhoid, were well below their earlier peak levels. In one very important respect
where maternity and child welfare services are concerned there were signs of greater activity:
the number of visits to clinics at health centres by expectant mothers in 1947 was
substantially higher than in 1941, unfortunately the last year before 1947 for which this
information is available, but having the highest recorded figure for any year up to that time.
The numbers of visits to clinics by infants and by pre-school children, though, were still
apparently somewhat lower in 1947 than their peak recorded levels early in the Second
World War, and it was not until two or three years after 1947 that these earlier peak levels
were surpassed.
It seems extremely likely, nevertheless, that there was an upsurge in public health
activities in Sri Lanka towards the end of the Second World War and afterwards. The specific
activities referred to in Tables 2 and 3 are only part of the picture; no data have been
presented on the provision of inpatient and outpatient facilities at hospitals or dispensaries,
                                                
6
 Even before this time there were some local schemes for the provision of midday meals in schools,
funded by municipalities or individuals; and post-1936 there was some local supplementation of
government expenditure on school meals, as well as encouragement of school gardens to provide
additional supplies.
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for example, or the availability of trained public health nurses and midwives, or the
involvement of these in visiting people in their homes, all areas where there might
conceivably have been improvements in this period. Some data relating to these matters are
available but problems of coverage and discontinuities of definition, as well as gaps in the
material, make them difficult to interpret. The figures relating to government expenditure on
health presented in Table 2 certainly do suggest very strongly that there were improvements
in health provision towards the end of the Second World War and afterwards: it may be seen
that spending grew especially rapidly in the period from 1944 (in fact, late 1943) until 1948.
This does not seem to have been merely a reflection of increased expenditure on malaria
eradication during this period: stripping out the costs of the anti-malaria campaign from total
government spending on health affects the figures on annual percentage growth in
expenditure only slightly.7 It may also be seen from Table 2 that government spending on
midday meals for children in schools, which had increased in successive years from the
outset, then more than doubled between 1943 and 1944, and continued to grow quite strongly
after that.
The effect of DDT-spraying on mortality in Sri Lanka
The Newman-Gray-Molineaux approach to the assessment of the effect of DDT-spraying on
mortality in Sri Lanka is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. This approach overlooks the
fact that, as has been pointed out, over and above the general longer-run downward trend in
mortality after about 1920 in Sri Lanka, there was also a fairly dramatic, albeit rather short-
lived, fall in mortality in the early 1940s. This fall followed an upsurge in public health
activities in Sri Lanka which came about as a result of the introduction of the Malaria Control
and Health Scheme: this both attests to the likely genuineness of the fall and draws attention
to the possible impact on mortality of such public health measures; moreover the fact that the
fall occurred in every part of Sri Lanka, except perhaps sub-zone I of the wet zone, the
healthiest part, strongly suggests that these measures could be effective even in the face of
endemic malaria. Comparing a longish pre-DDT period of time with the post-DDT situation,
which was the Newman-Gray-Molineaux approach—and Coale and Hoover's, for that
matter—thus has the effect of concealing an important change in the pre-DDT period which
is relevant to the interpretation of the post-DDT changes in mortality.
Another shortcoming of the Newman-Gray-Molineaux analysis is its reliance on the
spleen rate as an indicator of the level of malaria in an area. A high spleen rate in an area will
undoubtedly be a reflection of a high malaria prevalence in that area, but the latter will
depend not only on the risk of malaria infection but also on the likelihood of an attack being
serious and prolonged; this in turn will depend partly on the nutritional status and general
state of health of the population, so that, in the words of Carter, ‘The social status and
economic conditions of ... communities ... also influence the rates’; Carter went on to observe
that ‘Malnutrition ... exerts an important effect in many parts of Ceylon upon ... the
maintenance of high spleen rates’ (Carter 1927:14). A corollary is that in some degree
improvements in nutrition and general state of health would be expected to reduce spleen
rates, and malaria morbidity, and malaria mortality, even if exposure to the risk of malaria
remained unchanged.
                                                
7
 Visvalingam (1961:82) provides figures on the ‘expenditure on anti-malaria campaign’ from 1934
onwards.  No source is given but he was Superintendent of the Anti-Malaria Campaign at the time he
was writing.  Removing these amounts from the total expenditures on health shown in Table 2 results in
annual percentage changes in the remainder which are essentially the same as the percentage changes in
total expenditure shown in Table 2.
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A further weakness of the Newman-Gray-Molineaux approach is that, expressly or
implicitly, it assumes that attempts at malaria control before DDT-spraying were ineffective.
Gray simply states (1974:210): ‘Before 1945 malaria control was limited to ineffectual
larvacidal [sic] methods’. This judgement may well be incorrect. Particularly after the
introduction of the Malaria Control and Health Scheme in late 1936, armed with the detailed
knowledge of the habits and significance for malaria of A. culicifacies provided by Carter, an
elaborate system of monitoring potential danger areas and of responding where necessary
with larvicidal, and increasingly insecticidal, spraying was established; this was in addition to
all the usual activities designed to avoid the formation of bodies of stagnant water, large and
small. Those involved certainly did believe that these measures made a difference and in the
view of Rajendram and Jayewickreme (1951:21), referring to the malaria outbreaks of 1939-
1940, 1943 and 1945-1946, there was ‘little doubt that if it were not for the control measures
adopted in these years these epidemics might have assumed much larger proportions’.
According to Visvalingam (1961:64) ‘There is little doubt that the control measures adopted
under the new scheme had reduced the problem of malaria and the severity of epidemics
during these years’. If pre-DDT control measures did indeed have some effect, which seems
very likely, this needs to be borne in mind in thinking about any possible impact that DDT
might have had: first, in some degree DDT was merely supplanting earlier measures, so if
these were effective then any impact of DDT would have been in some degree a replacement
effect; secondly, had DDT not been available, there would undoubtedly have been a great
upsurge in antimalarial activity of the pre-DDT type after the Second World War, which if
such measures were indeed effective would itself have reduced mortality in some degree in
any case.
Given this complexity, can any assessment be made of the impact of DDT-spraying on
mortality in Sri Lanka? Consider first only the fall in mortality in the year 1947. It seems
reasonable to suppose that, even in the absence of DDT-spraying, the crude death rate in Sri
Lanka in 1947 would have fallen back at least to its previous minimum level, reached in
1942. The year 1947 was a favoured year in a number of respects: climatic conditions were
not conducive to epidemic malaria8 and there was a falling-back of mortality following the
fairly serious malaria outbreak of 1945-1946, which may well also have ‘brought forward’
some deaths; in addition, by 1947 food and other wartime shortages had ended and, as noted
previously, public health expenditure had noticeably increased. By contrast, the earlier low-
point in the crude death rate in 1942 had been achieved despite wartime difficulties.
As may be seen from Table 4 the Sri Lankan crude death rate in 1947 was 14.4 per 1000
population whereas the previous minimum figure, reached in 1942, was 17.9. Thus, assuming
that given the conditions in Sri Lanka in 1947 the crude death rate would have fallen at least
to the 1942 level, even without DDT-spraying, the maximum possible reduction in the 1947
crude death rate attributable to DDT-spraying is 20 per cent. However, there was no spraying
at all in sub-zone I of the wet zone at any stage; moreover, although spraying was carried out
in parts of sub-zones II and III of the wet zone, this would have had little or no impact in
1947 since this was not a year with epidemic conditions. Taking account of the reduction in
                                                
8
 Rajendram and Jayewickreme (1951) might be thought to have suggested otherwise by stating that
(p.46) ‘in 1947 both south-west and north-east monsoons were failures’. However, elsewhere in the
same article (p.31) they confined themselves to the expression ‘partial failure’ in relation to the south-
west monsoon in 1947 by which they clearly meant that rainfall was considerably below average (their
figures referred to the epidemic zone) in April and May (p.57).  Since rainfall was well above average
in January and in March of 1947 and reasonable, or in the case of August extremely heavy, from June to
October, there would have been no real reason to expect epidemic malaria in 1947.  Nor did Rajendram
and Jayewickreme suggest that there were epidemic conditions in 1947; their argument was that the
failure of the north-east monsoon in 1947 would have led to epidemic conditions in 1948.
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mortality that occurred anyway in sub-zone I of the wet zone, which could not have been due
Table 4
The minimum crude death rate (CDR) during the period 1936-1944, the crude death rate in each year 1942-1947, and the average crude death rate over the periods 1948-1951 and 1947-
1951, for Sri Lanka and the sub-zones of the wet and the dry zone of Sri Lankaa
Year(s)
Zone and sub-zoneb Min CDR CDR Average CDR
1936-1944c 1 9
4 2
1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948-1951 1947-1951
 Wet zone
I 16.5 16.7 16.9 17.7 17.7 16.2 13.6 12.8 13.0
II 15.7 15.7 17.8 19.4 19.7 18.1 13.7 13.6 13.6
III 15.2 15.2 17.6 18.4 20.2 18.1 13.2 13.1 13.1
 Dry Zone
Jaffna 20.6 20.8 24.5 21.5 22.2 17.1 15.5 12.7 13.3
Rest 22.5 22.5 27.1 25.7 27.4 27.7 16.2 12.4 13.1
 Sri Lanka 17.9 17.9 20.6 20.8 21.8 20.4 14.4 13.0 13.3
aSee appendix for complete data.
bSee Table 1 for the districts comprising the different sub-zones.
cThis is also the lowest rate recorded up to that time (since 1900) except in sub-zone I of the wet zone where the CDR in 1932 was 16.4.
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to DDT-spraying, the maximum possible reduction in the all-island 1947 crude death rate
attributable to DDT-spraying falls to 18 per cent; assuming further that no part of the wet
zone was affected by DDT in 1947 this figure falls to only 13 per cent. Moreover, even this
low figure is very likely to be an overestimate since it assumes that all of the reduction in
mortality occurring in the dry zone between 1942 and 1947 is attributable to DDT-spraying,
which is clearly highly improbable.
All in all, then, it seems very unlikely that the striking fall in mortality in Sri Lanka in
1947 itself had very much to do with DDT-spraying. However, what of the period
immediately following 1947? So far as the wet zone is concerned, it may be seen from Table
4 that mortality fell only a little further in the next four years, so on the face of it hardly
requiring a radical explanation. However, this is to presume that the absence of conditions
conducive to epidemic malaria characteristic of 1947 continued, whereas, at least according
to Rajendram and Jayewickreme (1951:12, 22, 47, 49), both 1948 and 1950 were years in
which epidemics would very probably have occurred historically, given the climatic
conditions. This being so, it could obviously be argued that DDT-spraying had prevented
these epidemics and hence the mortality they would have caused. However, making a
judgement on this would require not only an assessment of the likelihood of a malaria
epidemic in these years in the absence of any control measures but an assessment of that
likelihood given only pre-DDT control measures, though possibly on a considerable scale;
moreover, a judgement would also be required on the possible extent to which mortality in
any epidemic which did occur might have been reduced, perhaps considerably, by the
improvements in nutrition and in the availability of health services which very probably
occurred in this period. So far as the dry zone is concerned, it may be seen from Table 4 that
in the few years immediately following 1947 mortality fell distinctly further, below 1947
levels. Thus two questions arise in connection with the dry zone: first, what part did DDT
play in reducing mortality to these new low levels? Secondly, rather as in the case of the wet
zone, what part did DDT play in preventing any periodic malaria outbreaks, and consequent
mortality, that would otherwise have occurred?
Suppose that, as argued previously, DDT-spraying did not affect mortality at all in the
wet zone in 1947; and suppose further that one-half of the reduction in the crude death rate in
the sub-zones of the dry zone between 1942 and 1947 was attributable to DDT-spraying,
which seems unlikely to be an underestimate; then the crude death rate for Sri Lanka in 1947,
in the absence of DDT-spraying, would have been 15.4 per 1000 population, rather than the
observed rate of 14.4 per 1000. If, without DDT-spraying, the average crude death rate for Sri
Lanka over the four years following 1947 would have exceeded 15.4 by the same proportion
as the average crude death rate over 1943 to 1946 exceeded that for 1942, the average crude
death rate for Sri Lanka over the period 1948 to 1951 would have been 18 per 1000, meaning
that the average observed crude death rate for the five-year period 1947-1951 was 24 per cent
below the average expected rate in the absence of DDT-spraying. However, this is likely to
be a considerable overestimate of the impact of DDT-spraying in this period: as already
suggested, there is every reason to believe that in the absence of DDT, pre-DDT antimalarial
measures would have been deployed on a massive scale as epidemic conditions developed;
moreover, for the very many reasons already given, mortality would almost certainly have
been very much lower in any malaria outbreak that had occurred than during the wartime
period. If the potential proportional rise in mortality in Sri Lanka during the period 1948-
1951, over 1947, were judged to be half that which occurred during 1943-1946, over 1942,
then the average observed crude death rate for 1947-1951 would have been 19 per cent below
the average expected rate; if the potential rise were judged to be a quarter of the 1943-1946
rise, this would fall to 16 per cent. Even these figures will tend to be overestimates in that
they overlook the fact that there were further noticeable improvements in mortality after 1947
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in the dry zone, some part of which would undoubtedly have occurred, assuming favourable
climatic conditions, even in the absence of DDT-spraying; meaning that, effectively, the
baseline crude death rate of 15.4 per 1000 used in the calculations and hence also the
estimates of the potential mortality in outbreaks of malaria are somewhat too high.
Conclusion
It is clearly no easy task to estimate the impact of DDT-spraying on mortality in Sri Lanka
after the Second World War. The problem is not so much with the apparently dramatic fall in
mortality in the year 1947 itself: it is very unlikely that DDT-spraying played much part in
this. The problem is to assess its impact in the years that followed. This requires a whole
range of judgements in relation to events which did not occur: the likelihood of a malaria
outbreak given certain meteorological circumstances; the extent to which the probable
mortality associated with such an outbreak would have been moderated by improvements in
nutrition or health services; the extent and impact of the antimalarial measures that would
have been adopted had DDT not been available; and so on. The results of illustrative
calculations, on various assumptions, have been presented above; for what it is worth I
personally suspect that the effect of DDT-spraying on the 1947-1951 crude death rate may
well have been at or below the lowest assessment provided, that is, a reduction of 16 per cent;
however, the hard truth is, regrettably, that there does not seem to be an adequate empirical
basis for arriving at a reliable conclusion.
A number of comments should be added, finally, about analyses that were attempted
without success or could not be attempted because of lack of data. Despite considerable
effort, it has proved possible neither to verify nor refute Meegama's assertion that formerly
malarial districts enjoyed a disproportionate improvement in health services after the war; it
was concluded that there were simply too few data available on a district basis to permit this.
Another potential area of analysis to which a great deal of attention has been given without
success is causes of death. Although a large quantity of material on causes of death is
available for Sri Lanka, it was concluded, very reluctantly, that it is not of sufficient quality
to be helpful in this case; the main problem is the very large ‘pyrexia’ category (meaning,
simply, fever); it was felt that whilst this might well often conceal largely malaria the
relationship between malaria and ‘pyrexia’ could not be taken as fixed, indeed probably was
not, over time and space. An area, lastly, where analysis which might have been important
has not proved possible because of the complete absence of data, is that concerned with the
timing of DDT-spraying in different parts of Sri Lanka. If information had been available,
which does not seem to be the case, on the dates at which spraying began in different areas of
the country, it might well have been possible to examine the relationship of this timing to
changes in mortality, and so throw light on the question of a possible connection between
DDT-spraying and mortality decline.
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